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Abstract
Purpose – Because systemically important banks’ takeovers in the US were expected to contain the 2008
global financial crisis (GFC) but were found to have imposed large cost on shareholders, this paper examines
the effectiveness of these acquisitions during the GFC and investigates what went wrong with the market for
corporate control of large banks.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper presents a model of the disciplinary takeover based on the
efficientmarket hypothesis which provides appropriatemeasures for it to examine the financial performance of
acquiring banks after takeover.
Findings – The results indicate that the takeover market for large banks was ineffective in two aspects: the
market did not distinguish strong banks from weak banks before the crisis and acquirers performed worse
after takeover. Such ineffectiveness reflects the fundamental deficiencies of large bank takeovers arising from
some key distinguishing characteristics of large banks.
Research limitations/implications – The sample size of systemically important banks’ takeovers is small
so large-sample standard statistical inferences cannot be used.
Practical implications – The deficiencies of large bank takeovers need to be rectified in order to aid in
resolving future crises.
Originality/value – This paper provides rare and detailed insight based on case studies of large US bank
takeovers during the GFC.
Keywords Corporate control, Disciplinary takeover, Systemically important banks, Global financial crisis,
Information asymmetry, Pro-cyclicality
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
In the US and UK market-based financial systems, takeovers perform as the market for
corporate control because they transfer controls of weak firms to strong firms. They are the
principal form of management discipline which enhances the accountability of management
and the board to shareholders. However, some takeovers ended up as a disaster. For example,
RBS’s acquisition of ABNAMROwas a significant contributor to RBS’s failure in 2008 (FSA,
2011). Moreover, “most takeovers occur only after a prolonged period of corporate decline”
(Porter, 1992, p. 81). In particular, systematically important banks’ takeovers in the US that
were expected to contain the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) are found to have imposed
large cost on shareholders (Financial Commission, 2011; Protess, 2012). This paper will
examine the financial performance of these large US banks’ acquisitions during the GFC and
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The weakening function of large bank takeovers in the US is shown in two aspects. First,
takeovers of largeweak bankswere too late. During theGFC, the acquired banks in theUSwere
either nearly bankrupt or bankrupt (Macskasi, 2016). For example, JP Morgan Chase acquired
Bear Stearns with government support when Bear Stearns was near collapse in March 2008,
and JP Morgan Chase acquired the banking assets of Washington Mutual after Washington
Mutual went bankrupt in September 2008 which was the biggest bank failure in the US.
Second, there are few large bank takeovers in recent years. Since the GFC, mergers
involving large banks with assets of more than $10 billion in the US are rare (Kowalik et al.,
2015; Macskasi, 2016). The $28 billion acquisition of SunTrust by BB&T in 2019was the only
mega-transaction in the US banking industry in a decade.
Such deterioration suggests that takeovers may not be relied on as one of the primary
capital market solutions to large banks’ failure in future crises. However, the failure of large
banks can generate significant cost for shareholders and other stakeholders, especially
during financial crises. Moreover, there is evidence of flight to quality among large financial
institutions during the financial crisis of 2008–2009 (Inci et al., 2014). Therefore, it is important
to investigate the effectiveness of large bank takeovers during the GFC.
The paper contributes to the literature by presenting a general model of the disciplinary
takeover based on the efficientmarket hypothesis (EMH). Themodel is different frompopular
pure financial play models, and it proposes how to use appropriate financial performance
measures rather than some popular measures used in the literature to evaluate the
performance of acquirers. The paper analyzes the effectiveness of large bank takeovers in
terms of both operating performance and stock market performance based on this model by
investigating six private takeover deals of systematically important US banks during the
GFC. These deals are selected because they have significant implications for global financial
stability – they were expected by the US government to save weak banks to contain the GFC
and the acquirers are global systematically important banks (FSB, 2020).
The paper finds that large bank takeovers in the US during the GFC were not effective.
This is because the market could not distinguish strong banks from weak banks before the
GFC, and the performance of acquiring banks deteriorated after takeovers. This evidence is
different from the existing average evidence on large samples of takeovers among banks of
different sizes during normal times. It is helpful for addressing the specific deficiencies of
large bank takeovers during financial crises.
Based on the model of the paper, the fundamental condition for disciplinary takeovers to be
effective is that stock prices reflect fundamentals. However, due to some key distinguishing
characteristics of large banks including information asymmetry, pro-cyclicality, high leverage
and “too-big-to-fail” problem, it is difficult for the market to evaluate large banks’ performance
and stock prices are not a reliable guide for large banks’ valuation. As a result, this paper finds
that large bank takeovers were often carried out without proper valuation or a long-term view.
In addition, the performance of banks is highly correlated making it difficult for the market to
distinguish strong banks fromweak banks in good times and for strong banks to acquireweak
banks in bad times. Moreover, the high probability of bank insolvency in crises because of high
leverage makes it better for acquirers to acquire good assets of target banks after these target
banks go bankruptcy; therefore, takeovers are sometimes too late to save weak banks.
Although governments might intervene by providing support to acquirers for the sake of
financial stability, the taxpayers might have to pay for the downside risk of target banks.
It is necessary to acknowledge that there are some important qualifications when these
findings are interpreted in amuch broader context. First, it cannot use large-sample standard
statistical analysis for a small sample study. Second, the short-run results were affected by
the GFC and government support during the GFC (Goodhart, 2020; Song, 2020). Third, the
banking sector is a regulated industry which operates differently from other sectors, and its
business models in market-based systems are different from those in bank-based financial
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systems. Nonetheless, some qualifications can be rectified: First, case studies of this sample
can provide rare, direct and detailed insight; second, the financial performance in the long run
can minimize the effects of the GFC and government support in the short run.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 presents a simple model of the disciplinary takeover and its contribution to the
literature. Section 4 introduces the data and analyzes the results. Section 5 discusses why
large bank takeovers are not effective. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
There is an extensive literature on the disciplinary takeover. Some studies argue that a
market for takeovers is one mechanism which deals with the agency problem in modern
corporations which operate with a shareholder view that accepts shareholder primacy in the
UK and US (Manne, 1965). The shareholder primacy means that the vote of shareholders on a
takeover offer is the ultimate arbiter of a company’s interests (Dine, 2000). Due to the
separation of ownership and control, bidders can gain control either by a tender offer or by a
proxy fight without interference from the existing managers and board, thus pushing the
management to serve shareholders’ interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
However, it is argued that takeovers can serve as an effective disciplinarymechanism only
if the stockmarket provides an objective valuation of the firm. Some studies do find that stock
prices in large and liquid stock markets signal the implications of the corporate internal
decisions for net cash flows (Fama, 1970), and the stock market is efficient in the weak and
semi-strong forms but not the strong form (Miller, 1994; Brealey et al., 2020). However, Shiller
(2016) argues that there is evidence of speculative bubbles in which stock prices deviate from
fundamentals for a long period due to irrational exuberance.
Empirical studies on the value created in takeovers provide some inconclusive evidence.
Although takeovers are found, on average, to reduce shareholder returns of acquiring firms
(Malmendier et al., 2018), the evidence on the operating performance of takeovers is mixed
(Meeks, 1977; Healy et al., 1992; Malmendier et al., 2018; Song and Meeks, 2020).
On bank takeovers, the general finding is that they can generate operating efficiency gains
(DeYoung et al., 2009). For example, weak and inefficient banks are more likely to be the
targets of takeovers (DeYoung et al., 2009; Kowalik et al., 2015). However, the effect of
takeovers on returns to shareholders of acquiring banks is inconclusive (DeYoung et al.,
2009). Moreover, some studies find that the potential role of large bank takeovers has been
weakened by banks’ regulation, capital structure, size, valuation difficulties and
remuneration packages (e.g. De Haan and Vlahu, 2016). This paper contributes new
evidence to this strand of literature by investigating the performance of large bank takeovers
during the GFC and the impact of some key distinguishing characteristics of large banks.
There is also a large body of literature investigating takeovers drivenby other factors rather
than corporate governance. For example, some papers develop models to analyze takeover
activities based on the assumption of misevaluation of stock market participants (e.g. Shleifer
and Vishny, 2003). However, their models cannot be used to evaluate the effectiveness of
disciplinary takeovers because the fundamental condition of the effective market for corporate
control is efficientmarket. Therefore, this paper develops amodel based on the EMH. However,
this model can also be used as a benchmark to investigate takeovers if the market is inefficient.
3. A simple model of an effective market for corporate control
To discuss the effectiveness of the market for corporate control, a simple model is developed
to illustrate the disciplinary takeover.
Assume there are two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2 in the same sector, with total assets being
A1 andA2, equity being E1 andE2, total debt beingD1 andD2, return on equity being ROE1




stock market valuation per unit of equity being SP1 and SP2 respectively. So A15 D1þ E1
and A2 5 D2 þ E2. To simplify the model, assume dollar ($) is the unit of measurement of
value and each unit of equity represents one dollar. Therefore, SP1/1$ and SP2/1$ represent
Price/Book ratio (PBR) of Firm 1 and Firm 2 respectively. Assume Firm 1 and Firm 2 are
solvent, i.e.E1 > 0 andE2 > 0, and the stockmarket is efficient so that SP1 and SP2 are proper
valuations of these two firms based on the shareholder view as there is evidence that stock
returns do reflect ROE (Chen and Zhang, 2007; Goodhart, 2020). And assume the price/
earnings ratio of Firm 1 is PER1, and Firm 2 is PER2, and the sector is PER, then
PER1 5 SP1/ROE1 and PER2 5 SP2/ROE2.
Assume both firms pay out all earnings as dividends, andE1 andE2 remain the same over
time unless there are changes in the value of assets. However, stock prices will reflect ROE,
and ROE will change because of the change in operating performance.
To define a disciplinary takeover, assume that Firm 1 is the efficient firm and Firm 2 is the
inefficient firm in terms of ROE. Assume ROE1 > ROE2, therefore, SP1 > SP2 and
PBR1>PBR2.And to simplify themodel, assume this difference in efficiency only reflects the
difference in ROA rather than leverage (i.e. Debt/Equity (D/E)) or cost of debt (Rd) [1].
Therefore, assume ROA1 > ROA2, D1/E1 5 D2/E2, and Rd1 5 Rd2.
Assume Firm 1 pays a price P per unit of equity of Firm 2 to acquire Firm 2 [2]. Assume
goodwill for the target is G which comes from the difference between the consideration and
the net assets of Firm 2 and G ≥ 0, then P3 E25 E2þ G. As a result, (P1)3 E25 G and
P ≥ 1 as G ≥ 0 and E2 > 0 [3].
3.1 Hypothesis 1
Assume the market valuation per unit of equity of the merged firm is SPm (or PBRm) in the
short run after the announcement of the acquisition, and SPm (or PBRm) depends on the
market’s expectation about the future performance of themerged firm. Then the effectiveness
of the disciplinary takeover depends on whether SPm (or PBRm) generates gains to the
shareholders of event firms. Such gains depend on the methods of payment for the
acquisition. Acquirers may issue new debt and/or new equity to pay for acquisitions. If
the transaction is an all-cash deal, assume Firm 1 pays P using cash from borrowing debt,
then the shareholders of Firm 2 will gain (PSP2)3 E2. However, for Firm 1 shareholders, if
all units of equity of the merged firm are expected to earn ROEm (E(ROEm) is used to
represent the expected value of ROEm) and E(ROEm) ≥ ROE1, then SPm ≥ SP1 which
indicates that PBRm ≥ PBR1, they gain (SPm–SP1)3 E1. Otherwise, they will lose because
(SPm–SP1)3E1 is negative if E(ROEm) < ROE1 and SPm< SP1, and PBRm<PBR1. In this
case, the shareholders of Firm 1 bear all the risks of the acquisition in the short run.
However, if the transaction is an all-stock deal, Firm 1 issues shares to exchange the shares of
Firm 2, then the results are very different as Firm 2 shareholders are the shareholders of the
merged firm.AssumeFirm2 shareholders ownTproportion of the shares of themerged firm, then
T canbe calculatedbyT5P3E2/(E1þP3E2), andFirm1 shareholders own1Tproportion
of the shares ofmerged firms, i.e. 1T5 1 P3E2/(E1þ P3E2)5E1/(E1þ P3E2). In this
case, Firm 2 shareholders gainT3 SPm3 (E1þ P3 E2) SP23 E25 SPm3 P3 E2 SP2
3 E2 5 (SPm 3 P  SP2) 3 E2. So if SPm 3 P  SP2 > 5 0, i.e. SPm ≥ SP2/P, then Firm 2
shareholders gain. As P ≥ 1, SPm can be less than SP2 for Firm 2 shareholders to gain.
Firm 1 shareholders gain (SPm – SP1) 3 E1 as the units of equity remain the same for
them [4]. As long as E(ROEm) ≥ ROE1, and therefore, SPm ≥ SP1 which indicates that
PBRm ≥ PBR1, Firm 1 shareholders gain. Firm 2 shareholders also gain as SP1 > SP2.
Accordingly, one hypothesis for the acquiring firm in the short run in terms of stock
market performance (PBR) can be developed:
H1. The market for corporate control is effective in the short run if PBRm ≥ PBR1
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However, it is difficult to evaluate whether the market for corporate control is effective in
terms of operating performance in the short run. This is because there is no reliable data for
E(ROEm). As a result, it is also difficult to use the expected price/earnings ratio of the merged
firm (E(PERm)) as a measure for stock market performance in the short run. However, in the
long run, both ROE and PER of the merged firms can be observed and they could be used to
evaluate whether the market for corporate control is effective.
3.2 Hypotheses 2 and 3
To analyze the returns to shareholders in the long run, it is necessary to define what
conditionsmake the takeover successful. Assume that in the long run, all units of equity of the
merged firm earn ROEmf and the market valuation per unit of equity of the merged firm is
SPmf (or PBRmf), and return on assets is ROAmf. Then for a disciplinary takeover to be
successful due to the improvement of corporate governance of Firm 2, all considerations paid
by Firm 1 to Firm 2 shareholders (including E2þ G) should earn no less than ROE1, all units
of equity of the merged firm should earn ROEmf ≥ ROE1 and the stock price should be
SPmf ≥ SP1 which indicates that PBRmf ≥ PBR1.
The returns to Firm 2 shareholders in the long run also depend on themethods of payment
for the acquisition. If Firm 1 pays P using cash, then the shareholders of Firm 2 will gain (P
SP2)3 E2 which is the short-term gain. However, if Firm 1 uses shares for acquisition, then
Firm 2 shareholders gain T3 SPmf3 (E1 þ P3 E2)  SP23 E25 (SPmf3 P  SP2)3
E2. So if SPmf 3 P  SP2 ≥ 0, i.e. SPmf ≥ SP2/P, then Firm 2 shareholders gain. As P ≥ 1,
SPmf can be less than SP2 for Firm 2 shareholders to gain.
Based on the model, it seems that Firm 1 shareholders may be indifferent between all-cash
bids and all-stock bids as themethods of payment do not affect the conditions for them to gain
from the acquisition. That is, if E(ROEm) ≥ ROE1 in the short run or ROEmf ≥ ROE1 in the
long run, then Firm 1 shareholders gain. However, it is easier for themerged firm to realize the
expected ROE with all-cash bids which use higher leverage than all-stock bids [5]. Therefore,
ROAmf ≥ ROA1 should be used as one measure for identifying an effective disciplinary
takeover if the impact of leverage on ROEmf is to be controlled for [6].
Accordingly, two hypotheses for the acquiring firm in the long run in terms of both stock
market performance and operating performance (ROE and ROA) can be developed:
H2. The market for corporate control is effective in the long run if PBRmf ≥ PBR1
H3. The market for corporate control is effective in the long run if ROAmf ≥ ROA1 and
ROEmf ≥ ROE1
3.3 Hypothesis 4
As the operating performance of event banks in the long run can be affected by the general
economic and sector factors, it is common to use the performance of industry or non-event
matching firms to control for such effects. However, the validity of the results depends on the
appropriateness of the benchmarks (Meeks, 1977; Healy et al., 1992). As it is difficult to find
non-event matching firms for the sample in this paper, the bank sector is used as the control
group. In particular, the difference between the ROE of event banks and that of the bank
sector is used to measure the change in the operating performance of event banks during the
sample period. Accordingly, one more hypothesis for the acquiring firm can be developed:
H4. The market for corporate control is effective in the long run if ROEmf – Sector ROE
after merger ≥ ROE1 – Sector ROE before merger.
However, it is worth noting that the results for Hypotheses 4 are subject to some





It is difficult to develop a hypothesis for PER. This is because there is no definite
prediction about what could happen to PER in the long term after merger. The reason is that
PERmf 5 PBRmf/ROEmf, and both PBRmf and ROEmf are expected to increase if the
market for corporate control is effective. Moreover, PER also depends on the discount rate
which will change in line with the market risk premium based on the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM).
In summary, if the market for corporate control is effective, both measures of operating
performance (ROA and ROE) and stock market performance (PBR) of acquiring firms should
improve or at least not deteriorate after takeovers. This is different from the popular method
(e.g. Healy et al., 1992) which compares the actual performance of merged firms with the pro-
forma performance of the two combining event firms in years prior to the takeover. Based on
themodel in this paper, even if the actual performance ofmerged firms is greater than the pro-
forma performance of the two combining event firms in years prior to the takeover, the
acquiring firm can still lose if the actual performance of merged firms is worse than the
performance of acquiring firm before the takeover.
This model also suggests that it is necessary to use the change in price book ratio rather
than stock price to measure the stock market performance of takeovers. In the model, the
book value per unit of equity is assumed to be $1 and remains unchanged during the event
period. However, the book value per unit of equity will change in practice. Therefore, it is
appropriate to use PBR rather than SP to measure shareholders’ returns during the event
period. However, most literature (e.g. Malmendier et al., 2018) uses change in the stock price
during the event period to measure shareholders’ returns from takeovers.
In addition, the model is different from the models which assume that mergers are pure
financial plays based on the assumption of inefficient market. These pure financial play
models predict that the stock price of merged firmwill decrease in the long run because of the
overvaluation of the acquirer’s stock price during themerger period. Their assumption is that
there is no performance improvement arising from the merger in the long run (e.g. Shleifer
and Vishny, 2003).
3.4 Hypotheses testing
To test the hypotheses statistically, the t-test for mean and the non-parametric sign test for
median are conducted [7]. They report whether the mean and median of performance
measures in the post-takeover period deteriorated. The post-takeover performance measure
of each year (following Meeks (1977) and Song and Meeks (2020)) is calculated as the
difference between the relative value of each year minus the 3-year average of the relative
values in the pre-takeover period. The relative value of each year is calculated using the value
of 2006 as the basis which is assumed to be 100. The null hypothesis is that the difference is
greater than or equal to zero. As a result, if the p-value of the tests is less than or equal to 5%, it
can be claimed that the post-takeover performance deteriorates significantly.
4. Evidence
4.1 Data
During the GFC, there are six large US banks that were targets of acquisitions by other
large banks. Table 1 lists three acquiring banks and six target banks involved in these
mergers. Only Lehman Brothers failed to be acquired by other US banks. This sample is
unique and important because these acquisitions were expected by the US government
agencies to contain the systemic crisis, and four of them are top 10 US bank acquisitions in
recent years (Adams, 2012). In addition, “The turmoil that followed the failure of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008 has indeed led governments to commit to an unconditional
support of any troubled financial institution whose failure might create major disruptions”
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(Freixas and Rochet, 2013, p. 38). Moreover, the sample is selected because these banks are
systematically important banks (Alvarez, 2010; Financial Commission, 2011; Song, 2014;
FSB, 2020), and Gomez (2015) found that such takeovers may increase “the likelihood of
a future systemic failure when bankers are impatient or when risk taking profits are high”
(p. 46).
Moreover, all acquisitions were private deals that were agreed voluntarily and approved
by shareholders without government support except for the acquisition of Bear Stearns by JP
Morgan Chase (see Table 1). This indicates that these deals should have been driven mainly
by market behavior rather than government intervention (Alvarez, 2010), and they should
have been properly valued and expected by bank management to create value for
shareholders in the long run. Therefore, their long-term financial performance should truly
reveal the efficiency of large bank takeovers.
The sample period is from three years before the event year 2008 to seven years after 2008.
This is in linewithmost empirical literature onmergers. However, the acquiring company in a
merger always has difficulty in terms of performance for the first few years, and the merger
could be fully digested beyond 10–15 years. The paper looks at up to 7 years after the merger
due to two main factors: first, it is difficult to control for the impact of many other important
corporate events on the performance of the acquiring companies over a long period of time
after merger; second, there is not enough data [8].
Company financial data is hand-collected from annual reports of event banks; USD Libor
data is collected from https://fred.stlouisfed.org, PER and ROE data of the bank sector is
collected from http://www.damodaran.com and stock price data is collected from Yahoo
Finance.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 The performance of event banks before takeover. Before the GFC started in the second
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Note(s): (1) New stocks were issued to raise cash to pay for the acquisition. All other acquisitions are stock for
stock deals
(2) “Government support” indicates that there was government support for the deal on the event day
(3) “Deal agreed voluntarily” indicates that deal agreed with no government support
Source(s): Financial Commission (2011), Annual reports of acquiring banks
Table 1.
Merger attempts of




both operating performance (ROE and ROA) and stock market performance (PER and PBR)
(see Table 2). It is only at the end of 2007, half of six target banks were performing much
worse than acquiring banks. Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns andWachovia were performing
relatively well when the GFC started.
However, investment banks (i.e. Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch) were
highly leveraged than other banks. Table 2 reports that for these banks, equity over total
assets ratios (E/A) were around 5% or less whereas for other banks these ratios were around
7% or above. As their ROAs were very close to those of other banks, their relatively higher
ROEs came from higher leverage. However, their PERs and PBRs were close to those of other
banks in 2005 and 2006, indicating that the market did not realize the higher risk of these
investment banks that could arise from their higher leverage. In 2007, PBRs also suggest that
the market was confident in these banks.
4.2.2 The performance of acquirers after takeover. Most of the performance measures
deteriorate in the post-merger years. ROE, ROA and PBR are significantly worse for all
banks: the sign test and t-test report that all p-values are less than 5% (see Tables 3 and 4),
which indicates that themarket for corporate control is not effective in the long run according
to Hypotheses 2 and 3. And PBR in 2008 was negative for all event banks, which indicates
that the market for corporate control is not effective in the short run according to
Hypothesis 1.
However, relative to the bank sector, the performance of ROE is mixed (see Table 3). But
this is expected as discussed in Section 3. The t tests show that Bank of America and Wells
Fargo performed significantly worse and the sign test shows that Bank of America
performed significantly worse. But JPMorgan Chase performed much better which may be
Acquirers Targets
JPM BAC WFC CFC WB WAMU BSC MER LEH
ROE (%)
2005 8.0 16.5 19.6 22.7 14.1 14.9 16.5 15.0 21.6
2006 13.0 16.3 19.5 18.8 14.4 13.5 19.1 20.1 23.4
2007 13.0 11.1 17.1 4.6 9.0 0.4 1.8 33.0 20.8
PER (%)
2005 16.9 11.5 14.0 8.3 12.6 11.7 10.8 13.1 11.6
2006 12.1 11.7 14.4 9.9 12.3 12.5 10.7 12.3 10.8
2007 10.1 12.5 12.7 4.4 11.7 113.4 65.6 5.5 8.6
PBR
2005 1.3 1.8 2.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.2
2006 1.4 1.8 2.6 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.3 2.2
2007 1.2 1.3 2.1 0.2 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.8 1.6
E/A (%)
2005 8.9 7.9 8.8 7.3 9.0 7.9 3.8 5.2 4.1
2006 8.6 9.3 8.9 7.2 7.7 7.8 3.5 4.6 3.8
2007 7.9 8.6 9.0 6.9 9.0 7.5 3.0 3.1 3.3
ROA (%)
2005 4.8 5.5 5.9 5.9 5.4 5.4 5.0 5.1 5.2
2006 6.1 6.5 6.7 6.4 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.2 6.2
2007 6.3 6.2 6.7 5.0 6.0 5.2 5.6 4.5 6.2
Note(s): Data are hand-collected from annual reports of each bank
ROA (%) is calculated using ROE, E/A and borrowing cost of banks which is the 3 month USD Libor
Negative numbers are not meaningful but indicating that banks have losses rather than positive earnings
E/A (%) is equity over total assets ratio
Table 2.
The performance of
large US banks before
the acquisitions
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due to its much lower E/A ratios (see Table 5). Therefore, there is no consistent evidence
supporting Hypothesis 4.
To demonstrate why these measures are important, the results in terms of shareholder
returns which are a popular measure in the literature are reported here for comparison.
Acquiring banks performed worse in the event year 2008 in terms of total cumulative
shareholder returns (TCSRs) (see Table 4). However, statistical tests report that only Bank of
America performedworse in the post-takeover years. One reason could be that the book value
per share of Bank of America has declined significantly while those of the other two banks
have increased significantly since the event year 2008 (see Table 5). Therefore, it is not
appropriate to use the TCSR tomeasure the actual returns of shareholders because it does not
control for the impact of the book value per share.
Overall, the evidence indicates that large bank takeovers are ineffective. First, the market
did not realize that target banks were significantly weaker than acquirers prior to the GFC.
Second, acquirers performed worse in the post-merger period than in the pre-merger period.
Year
ROE (%) ROA (%)
JPM BAC WFC JPM BAC WFC
2008 56.41 78.80 71.48 57.66 61.68 61.67
2009 41.03 89.94 45.41 76.76 84.77 77.83
2010 10.26 89.97 43.10 68.48 82.26 70.98
2011 2.56 89.61 34.90 62.82 77.99 63.43
2012 2.56 82.05 29.68 70.78 84.20 69.13
2013 17.95 61.46 24.97 73.02 77.89 67.56
2014 10.26 79.41 27.32 71.14 82.78 68.84
2015 2.56 51.38 31.47 66.53 73.77 69.92
Number of observations 8 8 8 8 8 8
Median 10.26 80.73 33.19 69.63 80.12 68.98
Sign test (one-tailed p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 17.95 77.83 38.54 68.40 78.17 68.67
Mean test (one-tailed p-value) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROE (%)-sector ROE (%)
2008 7.95 2.47 1.33
2009 4.55 4.75 1.02
2010 5.01 8.29 2.07
2011 4.63 9.61 1.85
2012 2.94 15.95 8.40
2013 1.88 5.78 0.66
2014 1.17 10.41 2.83
2015 2.63 5.39 3.18
Number of observations 8 8 8
Median 3.59 7.04 1.96
Sign test (one-tailed p-value) 1.00 0.04 0.14
Mean 3.11 7.22 2.08
Mean test (one-tailed p-value) 0.99 0.00 0.05
Note(s):The operating performance of each year is the relative value of each year minus the 3-year average of
the relative values before takeover. The relative value of each year is calculated using the value of 2006, which
is assumed to be 100, as the basis. The original ROE of bank sector is collected from http://www.damodaran.
com. Other data is hand-collected from annual reports of each bank. The original ROA (%) is calculated using
ROE, E/A and borrowing cost of banks which is the 3 month USD Libor. The null hypothesis for the sign test









5. Why large bank takeovers are not effective
The effectiveness of large bank takeovers is significantly affected by some key
distinguishing characteristics of large banks. These characteristics include information
asymmetry, pro-cyclicality, high leverage and “too-big-to-fail” problem. The effects of these
factors are discussed in detail.
5.1 Information asymmetry
Information asymmetry affects the stock market efficiency. Stock prices of large banks
cannot be a reliable guide for valuation based on which the market for corporate control





JPM BAC WFC JPM BAC WFC
2008 30.30 62.77 23.23 21.33 57.88 1.16
2009 18.34 51.97 41.46 2.48 55.88 6.16
2010 22.45 55.62 40.30 4.59 58.88 7.84
2011 41.21 75.58 50.20 14.62 75.88 2.16
2012 31.22 59.06 45.70 13.17 62.36 22.84
2013 14.54 49.15 34.12 51.37 53.66 64.84
2014 14.65 44.29 27.90 74.99 48.15 101.84
2015 15.07 49.44 31.48 78.51 50.18 105.84
Number of observations 8 8 8 8 8 8
Median 20.40 53.79 37.21 8.88 56.88 15.34
Sign test (one-tailed p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.86
Mean 23.47 55.98 36.80 23.65 57.86 36.72
Mean test (one-tailed p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.97
Note(s):The stockmarket performance of each year is the relative value of each yearminus the 3-year average
of the relative values before takeover. The relative value of each year is calculated using the value of 2006,
which is assumed to be 100, as the basis. Data is hand-collected from annual reports of each bank. The stock
market return assumes that all dividends are reinvested during the years. The null hypothesis for the sign test
and t-test is that the median and mean of stock market performance measure are greater than or equal to zero
respectively
Year
Book value per share Equity over total assets ratio
JPM BAC WFC JPM BAC WFC
2005 91.81 85.25 89.31 103.49 84.79 98.87
2006 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
2007 109.39 108.05 106.48 91.86 92.34 101.80
2008 108.07 93.50 119.01 89.53 105.07 92.12
2009 119.22 72.32 147.61 94.19 112.30 72.18
2010 128.67 70.67 165.73 96.51 108.74 103.27
2011 139.07 67.64 181.58 94.19 116.61 111.60
2012 153.03 68.15 203.68 101.16 115.64 116.67
2013 158.95 69.73 217.24 101.16 119.42 114.53
2014 170.34 71.78 237.21 104.65 124.81 111.04
2015 180.75 75.89 248.93 122.09 128.91 108.33
Note(s): Data is hand-collected from annual reports of each bank
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of large banks properly based on ROE and other available information. To mitigate
information asymmetry, fair value accounting is applied to measure a significant portion of
the assets of large banks to increase consistency and comparability of financial reporting
(Song, 2014). However, judgment is required to determine fair value if there is no observable
data other than that from distressed sales, which could erode the market’s confidence in the
valuation of large banks’ assets.
Indeed, there is evidence that fair value accounting accentuated fire sales of assets and
contributed significantly to the GFC (Song, 2020). As a result, it was very difficult to reach
agreements on takeovers of large banks during the GFC. For example, in the case of Lehman
Brothers, there was significant difference in the valuation of the bank’s assets in September
2008. Even though Lehman Brothers insisted that it was solvent, Bank of America CEO Ken
Lewis argued that Lehman Brothers could be overvalued by $60 to $70 billion, and he could
agree to acquire Lehman Brothers only if there was government support (Financial
Commission, 2011). In the case of Countrywide, Bank of America paid approximately $4
billion for the acquisition, but probably lost $40 billion due towrite-downs, legal expenses and
settlements because of troubles of Countrywide (Protess, 2012).
Indeed, the inevitable information asymmetry can be the real flaw in the shareholder view
(Miller, 1994). This is because management cannot disclose all information of the proposed
projects for fear of competition. For example, the aim of Bank of America’s acquisition of
Merrill Lynch was to create a company unrivalled in its breadth of financial services and
global reach. But Bank of America was charged by the SEC “with failing to disclose about
$9.5 billion of known and expected Merrill Lynch losses before the December 5 shareholder
vote”which “deprives shareholders of material information that was critical to their ability to
fairly evaluate the merger” (Financial Commission, 2011, p. 383).
5.2 Pro-cyclicality
Pro-cyclicality also affects the stock market efficiency. Banks are pro-cyclical because their
credit supply to the economy depends on the business cycle. This creates the pro-cyclicality of
banks’ stock prices because stock prices are affected by earnings forecasts which rely on the
quality of financial reporting (Greenspan, 2002), and financial reporting is pro-cyclical due to
fair value accounting in addition to loan loss provisions [9] (Laeven and Huizinga, 2019; Song,
2014; Wheeler, 2019).
Indeed, the valuation of banks is pro-cyclical. The stock return of financial sector performs
better in the early cycle and performsworse in the recession (Emsbo-Mattingly andHofschire,
2017). This pro-cyclicality means that stock prices cannot be a reliable indicator for banks’
operating performance and risk (FSA, 2009), and the performance of most banks is highly
correlated. During booms most banks perform well and during crises most banks perform
poorly, making it difficult to distinguish strong banks from weak banks as their businesses
are complex and diversified (Yang and Tsatsaronis, 2012), which is documented in Section 4.
Moreover, after the GFC, large banks’ business models are becoming more similar
(Roengpitya et al., 2014), and this could make the correlation of the performance of large
banks more significant.
As a result, during crises, there are few large banks which are strong enough to acquire
weak banks. For example, during the GFC, JP Morgan was “the only candidate with the size
and stature tomake a credible offer with 48 h” to Bear Stearns (Financial Commission, 2011, p.
290), and it also was the only bidder forWashingtonMutual. However, there was no buyer for
Lehman Brothers as Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch and Barclays withdrew
(Financial Commission, 2011).
In addition, pro-cyclicality and trust erosion due to information asymmetry promote short-
termism in the equity market (Wehinger, 2011). Bank shareholders and management make




Moreover, the pressure from the real and the perceived threat of takeover also help prohibit
CEOs from taking a long view (Charkham, 1993). For example, although Citigroup was a
troubled bank, it offered to acquire Wachovia with US government support. If Wells Fargo
had not won the bidding war, “Citigroup would have had to have been bailout again”
(Financial Commission, 2011, p. 370).
5.3 High leverage
Banks’ high leverage increases the probability of bank insolvency in crises. This reduces the
willingness of a strong bank to buy a weak bank that could be insolvent. In the model of
Section 3, if E2 of Firm 2 is negative, it is hard for Firm 1 to justify why it will pay a price P to
acquire Firm 2 as Firm 1 will assume more debt than the value of assets from the acquisition.
The best strategy for Firm 1 is to buy the good assets from Firm 2 after Firm 2 goes bankrupt
as Firm 2’s assets will be selling at the prevailing depressedmarket rate, and the shareholders
and creditors of Firm 2 pay for the losses made by Firm 2.
Indeed, Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in 2008 illustrates this failure of the market of
corporate control for large banks. One key reason that the acquisition efforts to rescue
Lehman Brothers failed is that Lehman Brothers was thought to be insolvent by the Fed, US
Treasury, SEC and some bankers involved in the acquisition efforts (Financial Commission,
2011). The US government officials thought it needed more than $12 billion to keep Lehman
Brothers alive as a going concern, however, Barclays bought the healthiest assets of the bank
at $1.75 billion after it filed for bankruptcy protection (Schaefer, 2010).
5.4 Too-big-to-fail problem
Governments often support large banks for the sake of financial stability, and this generates
themarket perception of “too-big-to-fail.”With such a perception, themarket has no incentive
to monitor the bank risk which makes the disciplinary role of takeovers ineffective. Indeed,
there is evidence that the market has positive stock price reactions to too-big-to-fail banks
(Allen et al., 2018).
When governments support large bank takeovers during the crises, the function of
corporate control can be further eroded. This is because valuation of target banks could be
compromised as acquiring banks can benefit from these takeovers at the expense of
taxpayers if the actual performance of target banks is worse than expected by the
government. Acquiring banks obtain a call option with little cost as the government
guarantees the liability of target banks by acquiring assets of target banks. Indeed, JP
Morgan Chase’s acquisition of Bear Stearns was supported by the US Fed which agreed to
bear any losses up to $28.82 billion; however, JP Morgan Chase only bore the risk of the first
$1.15 billion of losses (Financial Commission, 2011).
Moreover, government intervention may push large banks into “a shotgun wedding”
without sufficient information disclosure to the public when they are in difficulty. For
example, in the case of Lehman Brothers during the GFC, one option that a Fed official put
forward to resolve the bank was to “find a buyer at any price” (Financial Commission, 2011,
p. 331).
6. Conclusions
The paper finds that takeovers have not played the role of themarket for corporate control for
large banks effectively. Based on a general model of the disciplinary takeover, the paper
investigates the performance of systemically important banks’ takeovers in the US during the
GFC. The evidence suggests that the market was ineffective as it did not distinguish strong
banks from weak banks before the GFC. Moreover, acquiring banks failed to improve their
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performance after takeover. It is important to emphasize that there are limitations of these
results which are common to small sample studies and the GFC could have a significant effect
on them in the short run.
Some key distinguishing characteristics of large banks have contributed to the
deficiencies of large bank takeovers. First, information asymmetry makes it difficult for
event banks to evaluate takeovers. Second, pro-cyclicality enhances the correlation of
performance of banks. In addition, pro-cyclicality, together with information asymmetry,
promotes short-termism which prevents bank management from holding a long-term view.
Third, banks’ high leverage increases the probability of bank insolvency during crises which
makes takeovers urgent but difficult to implement. Finally, government support of takeovers
generates the problem of too-big-to-fail which often benefits banks at the expense of the
taxpayer.
Therefore, it is important to deal with these deficiencies. Indeed, some important new
measures have been developed. For example, banks are required to employ a “bail-in”
strategy, hold a long-term view, strengthen capital and liquidity positions and adopt the EL
models for financial reporting. Further research is needed to investigate whether these
measures can rectify the deficiencies of the takeover market for large banks.
Notes
1. This assumption is made because ROE is affected by ROA, Rd and D/E based on the
formula ROE ¼ ROAþ ðROA−RdÞ * ðD=EÞ.
2. Assume the accounting method is the acquisition (purchase) method as the pooling of interests
method was eliminated since 2001 by FASB and 2004 by IASB.
3. In the model, assumeG≥ 0 in normal conditions. However, when a target firm is on a forced sale, it is
possible that G ≤ 0. For example, JP Morgan Chase’s acquisition of Bear Stearns generated negative
goodwill $8.9 billion as $1.4 billion was paid by JP Morgan Chase to acquire $10.3 billion net assets.
But such negative goodwill is required to be recognized in earnings as of the acquisition date by
accounting standards.
4. This result is the same as that computed using this formula ð1−TÞ 3 SPm 3 ðE1þ P 3 E2Þ
− SP13E1.
5. This is because ROE ¼ ROAþ ðROA−RdÞ * ðD=EÞ. For the merged firm with all cash-bids,
ROEmf ¼ ROAmf þ ðROAmf−Rd1Þ3 ððD1þ D2þ E2þ GÞ=E1Þ. However, with all stock-bids,
ROEmf ¼ ROAmf þ ðROAmf−Rd1Þ3 ððD1þ D2Þ=ðE1þ E2þ GÞÞ. Therefore, all-cash bids use
higher leverage than all-stock bids.
6. Indeed, there is evidence that firms achieve a higher ROE by borrowing money to buy back
outstanding equity (Goodhart, 2020).
7. As the sample size is small, both parametric and non-parametric methods are used, which follows the
general practice in the literature.
8. Thanks to one referee for this issue.
9. Loan loss provisions used the incurred loss approach which was replaced with expected loss (EL)
models by IFRS 9 in 2014 and by FASB in 2016.
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